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With respect to relocation (delocalisation) issues two attitudes can be contrasted. According to the most standard 
one, relocation does not create any problem when full competition prevails in product, labour, and capital 
markets. Changes in transportation and production costs may generate changes in location by firms in 
manufacturing industry at the benefit of less developed countries. In more developed countries, jobs are shifting 
from e.g. manufacturing to services industry, and the negative impact on households’ purchasing power of lower 
nominal wages, if any, will be more than offset by lower prices of imported final goods. Unemployment will be 
frictional and temporary, unless market labour rigidities prevent the necessary jobs’ shifting. According to a 
different perspective, relocation may become a real issue when considering it as an aspect of a process of 
creative destruction  that necessarily results in local distortions in the structure of productive capacity and hence 
in market disequilibria. In the latter perspective, relocation can no longer be viewed as an equilibrium 
phenomenon. It may be associated with an increasing rate of unemployment and make it necessary for public 
authorities to intervene. In fact, all depends on the way co-ordination issues are dealt with. But focusing on 
attractiveness and competitiveness of territories may lead public authorities to implicitly consider international 
trade as a zero (or negative) sum game and implement supply side oriented policies that are fundamentally 
misconceived and could increase market disequilibria. Thus it is necessary to consider how production location 
really takes place out of equilibrium and how relocation may end in a quasi-dynamic equilibrium. Public 
interventions are required, which consist in combining structural and macroeconomic policies, the former being 
efficient only if the latter are growth oriented. The aim of this paper is precisely to argue according to the latter 
perspective. 
 
1. Introduction 
Change in firms’ location is a permanent phenomenon strongly related to any structural change. It involves local 
jobs’ destruction, not only in the manufacturing sectors stricto sensu, but also in value-added services to 
industry. This phenomenon becomes really worrying when it takes place in economies also characterised by 
decelerating productivity gains, a low job creation, and unemployment. In such a context, relocation is wrongly 
but usually perceived as one of the ultimate causes of unemployment. And the usual suspect is international trade 
coupled with huge differences in social and environmental standards.  
However, while tenants of the latter assertion plead for some protection arguments, tenants of liberal orthodoxy 
maintain that implementing competition rules will prevent any problem to occur. 
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We intend to show that things are much more complex. On the one hand, international trade cannot be 
considered as responsible of increasing unemployment and reducing income in any country: in an equilibrium 
context, it cannot be but a positive sum game. Importing new goods and services that results from relocation 
creates new opportunities (allows using productive resources in a different and more productive way) inside the 
country. On the other hand, although international (or interregional) trade is a major contribution to growth both 
in developed and developing countries it is also responsible for some of the social and distributional costs. 
“Why? Because trade can generate sizable benefits only by restructuring economies – that is the essence of 
specialization according to comparative advantage – and in the real world restructuring does not happen without 
someone bearing costs. The flip side of the gains from trade is the losses that have to be incurred by adversely 
affected workers and enterprises (…) Simply put: no pain, no gain. It makes little sense to pretend otherwise” 
(Rodrik 1998 p. 5). Growth is not a regular process, and as such its relation with trade is far from being trivial. 
Changes in the geographical distribution of economic activities, which are in the nature of the growth process, 
may go hand-to-hand with internal distortions in the structure of productive capacity that cannot be eliminated 
by simply liberalising trade and allowing the economy to be as near as possible to a state of perfect competition. 
As a matter of fact, changes in firms’ location, e.g. at the detriment of advanced countries (and at the benefit of 
the less developed), become harmful when these distortions end in a lower growth rate and a higher 
unemployment rate in the former countries. This phenomenon has nothing to do with international trade per se 
but reveals how domestic distortions change the impact of international trade. In this case, public policies that 
focus on competitiveness of territories may have a paradoxical content, leading to implicitly consider trade as 
zero sum game and hence resulting in aggravated distortions, which are easy to mistakenly attribute to 
international trade.  
Indeed, it is essential to remove any ambiguity about the role of international trade. First of all, there is no clear 
evidence that the loss of manufacturing jobs due to growing import penetration has not been offset by the job 
creation effect of growing exports. This means that the loss of manufacturing jobs would have little to do with 
international trade and much more to do with domestic issues. Moreover, as underlined by Krugman (1995), 
trade surplus is not necessarily a sign of economic strength when foreigners are reluctant to lend to the country 
or to invest in it. From a more general viewpoint, relocation is nothing but an aspect of the breaking-up in the 
industrial structures, which is the nature of any innovation process, and of the intrinsic difficulty to manage this 
process, whatever the degree of trade liberalisation. 
Although there is no evidence that relocation is now a significant problem in developed countries, this 
phenomenon feeds a current debate, which has two advantages. It signals the complexity of the relation between 
the geographical distribution of economic activities and the performances of  countries. It takes place in 
countries that experience low growth and increasing unemployment, all phenomena that have to be explained. 
In short, the loss of jobs in manufacturing sectors coupled with effective relocation of their activities by firms of 
industrialised countries may appear as one of the problems facing these countries. But the question is what to do 
with it rather than how to impede any structural change. The real problem lies in the distortion that emerges from 
an inevitable and powerful structural change. International trade, which is beneficial in an undistorted economy 
turns to be harmful because of a domestic distortion. This does not mean that distortions in the international 
trade (protectionism) must be introduced (Krugman 1996). The logic answer is that domestic distortions have to 
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be eliminated. Thus, it is necessary to identify the nature and the significance of these domestic distortions. Are 
they cost differentials, too high wages, or anything else? To what extent are they related to external trade and 
foreign investment? 
The remainder of this paper contains four sections. Section 2 offers an analysis of relocation within the standard 
(equilibrium) framework, which leads to focus on fundamentals and ipso facto to recommend competitiveness 
strategies, the efficiency of which is really doubtful. Section 3 then focuses on the real nature of distortions and 
co-ordination issues at the local (national) level. Section 4 shows how domestic distortions influence reciprocal 
demands, and hence why and how international trade matters. Finally, section 5 reviews policy implications. 
2. The hypothesis of relocation in the current analysis and the obsession of competitiveness 
Current economic analysis does not address directly the phenomenon of relocation. So we have to consider what 
could be its significance with respect to the results of new models that are a mix of geographical and 
international economics.  
Within the standard analytical framework, relocation is nothing but an aspect of a core – periphery pattern, 
which would be reversed as a consequence of a reduction of transport costs coupled with a huge differential of 
wages. In this perspective, the loss of ‘high’-wage manufacturing jobs in the core would be associated with 
international trade and foreign direct investment as induced by decreasing transport costs. This assertion is the 
essence of the so-called deindustrialisation or relocation hypothesis. 
New economic geography modelling stresses technology in the standard way as the ‘fundamental’ determining 
both the growth rate of different countries and the spatial distribution of economic activities. The relevant 
attributes of technology in this case are local externalities, transport costs, costs of communication of new ideas 
and knowledge, R&D spillovers (Krugman and Venables 1995, Martin, Ottaviano 1999, Baldwin, Martin, 
Ottaviano 2001). Technology, far from being a result of a process of innovation, is a pre-condition of it. 
Decreasing unit costs and increasing variety of goods that generates forward and backward linkages are an 
immediate outcome of the choice of introducing a new technology. Relocation follows, but without creating co-
ordination problems that would result in the reduction of income and the appearance of unemployment in the 
countries concerned with delocalisation. 
As a matter of fact, relocation cannot be considered as a real problem when it only exists in industrial clustering. 
Within an equilibrium framework, trade liberalisation fits in with industrial clustering. Firms and consumers are 
more outward oriented. If market proximity is less important than local linkages as competitive forces to be 
taken into account by each firm, then industrial clustering will be more intense as a consequence of a deeper 
integration. Breaking the symmetry between supply and demand forces at the local level will induce changes in 
the location of firms, but these changes cannot be considered as harmful when they do not result in higher 
unemployment and lower income. On the one hand, specialisation is supposed to only induce changes in type of 
jobs in each cluster without global effect on employment. On the other hand, real-income gains are supposed to 
flow from clustering of industries. This explains why industries are more highly clustered in the US than in 
Europe, without harmful effects on employment in any geographical area. Clustering is here a quasi-dynamic 
equilibrium. The only problem (not addressed in the equilibrium models) is a transitional one: workers that have 
to change job suffer a transitory real-income loss in the process (Fujita and alii 1999 p. 293). 
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In a country that faces delocalisation, the only attitude, which is coherent with standard analysis, would consist 
for public authorities in accepting changes in firms’ location and hence allowing consumers to benefit from 
lower prices of goods produced abroad. Such an attitude relies upon the assumption that full employment is 
maintained and hence a local market for these goods continues to exist. 
Of course things are very different whether there is mobility of labour or not. With labour mobility there will be 
agglomeration and a cumulative process of geographical concentration, given the existence of some centripetal 
forces. Without labour mobility, one cannot have this kind of evolution. The same kind of forces will result in a 
process of international specialisation that concentrates particular industries in a limited number of countries, and 
not in a classic process of agglomeration that would also involve a concentration of population (Fujita and alii 
1999 p. 240).  
In the latter case, domestic distortions may generate unemployment and relocation appears as a real problem. 
Appropriate policy-making would be the one that focuses on supply conditions, aimed at increasing competitive 
advantages for an economy with respect to its external competitors. Reducing wage differentials, improving 
labour market flexibility, reducing taxes, improving public infrastructures seem to be the only policies aimed at 
influencing the rationale of agents in their location choices and favouring the attractiveness of territories.  
In this perspective, relocation can be considered as an effect of innovation taking place abroad, and characterised 
by a (sudden) decrease in unit costs. It may be impeded or reversed thanks to supply-side oriented policies. The 
solution for the more advanced countries would consist in encouraging social and fiscal dumping or in 
developing new varieties of goods in order to compensate the prevalent asymmetry of costs. In the former case, 
policies are aimed at reducing current production costs. In the latter case, the objective is to escape from price 
competition by enhancing R&D and higher education and promoting a new division of labour.  
The attempt to carry out supply-side oriented policies is directly inspired by the necessity of fighting against a 
high rate of unemployment, whether this rate is presumed to be higher than the NAIRU or, due to the rigidity of 
the wage rate, the NAIRU itself is too high. The problem is that, in the actual (out-of-equilibrium) context, the 
efficiency of these policies is really doubtful.  
As for the cost-oriented competitive policy, it seems difficult if not impossible to compensate huge wages’ 
differentials. On the other hand, any policy that consists in compensating wages differential by reducing non-
wage costs thanks to infrastructure spending, fiscal reductions, or subsidies may favour the attractiveness of 
territories, but also make unstable localisation choices by decreasing exit (relocation) costs: if there is no specific 
advantage for a firm to be located in one area or another, then the absence of sunk costs makes location easily 
contestable. 
As for R&D oriented competitive policy, it is worth mentioning that vertical (or quality) differentiation of 
products, as pure a firm’s supply strategy, is not necessarily a solution insofar as successful emergent economies 
are engaged in a growth strategy that consists in being at the frontier of productivity gains. It is well documented 
that openness appears as a necessary condition for a backward economy to capture the (external) demand that 
makes it possible to produce the mix of goods allowing a higher potential of learning (i.e., a higher productivity 
growth), and thus to catch up with the most advanced countries. In fact, the backward economy, in order to 
maximise its growth rate of productivity needs to face a wide gap between the mix of goods produced and the 
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mix consumed, and this makes unavoidable international trade (Lucas 1993). Of course, all countries may 
benefit from the enlargement of international trade, which is not a zero sum game by assumption. But this 
depends on what happens on the demand side. Firms of advanced countries will really be in the position of 
developing new technologies and new products if local as well as external markets are large enough, that is, in 
particular, if unemployment does not increase.  
Competitiveness policies are sometimes presented as relevant with respect to the prevalent changes in the 
institutional environment. Transition from a multinational market highly influenced by regulated exchanges 
among nations to a global market regulated by international trade and investment agreements would be quite a 
structural shock that would change the nature of regional barriers to trade. In this new institutional context, due 
to sharp decreases in transportation costs, which tend to zero in the case of immaterial value-added activities, 
production areas are disconnected from the market they are designed for. Thus local markets (in fact, population 
differential) would be no longer of importance in the determination of firms’ location, in fact in a limited number 
of activities. Minimisation of production costs would be much more important than market proximity. Indeed, 
reference to the new institutional setting is nothing but a way of reshuffling the same argument, which is derived 
from the models of new economic geography: given costs advantages and local externalities interact and this 
interaction determines the geographical landscape. Changes in the institutional setting may transform market and 
costs conditions so as to make public policies necessary in the perspective of counterbalancing location effects of 
such a transformation. Anyway, this does not make less doubtful the efficiency of policies focusing on 
competitiveness of territories.  
Summing-up, policies that simply focus on costs reduction or variety enlargement, targeting the value of 
fundamentals by means of structural reforms, cannot be considered as substitutes for growth policies. The reason 
is that within an environment characterised by a low growth rate, they may amplify distortions and hence 
generate cumulative processes and uneven development. Really, relocation becomes a real issue because it takes 
place as a consequence of a process of creative destruction , which would result in opposite cumulative changes 
in polar geographical areas (North and South or West and East). In this case, differences in ‘fundamentals’, i.e. 
differences in unit costs or in product variety, cannot account for growth differentials among territories. 
Ambiguity of the analysis that only focuses on competitiveness is owing to the attempt of dealing with relocation 
issues within an equilibrium framework. 
3. Nature of distortions and co-ordination issues: new perspectives in economic geography 
The real strength of any regional cluster of economic activities (which prevent its decline) lies in its capacity for 
both internal diversification and structural change. Variety of goods and services and spillovers within as well as 
between sectors are the main sources of economic growth. There are two ways to relate variety to regional 
economic development. The first one focuses on variety as an innovative strategy that implies for a region to be 
specialised in a particular composition of complementary sectors. The second one focuses on variety as a 
portfolio strategy that protects the local economy from external demand shocks (Frenken et alii 2004). 
Contrasting these two approaches, empirical investigation about regional growth in the Netherlands concludes 
that related diversification is more rewarding for growth and employment than unrelated one (ibid.). “Related 
variety indeed enhances employment growth while other type of agglomeration economies are not significant. 
Knowing that related variety is mainly present in densely populated areas, and given that population density is 
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not significantly affecting employment growth, we can conclude that related variety in cities is responsible for 
job creation and not urban density in itself” (ibid. p. 39). To some extent, these results are corroborated by 
another empirical study, which is concerned with agglomeration effect on the productivity of firms in the French 
employment areas (Mulkay 2004). This study has two main results. On the one hand, when qualification shares 
and the industrial structure in employment areas are introduced as explanatory variables, economic density is not 
any more a determinant of labour productivity. On the other hand, while specialisation (the degree of unrelated 
diversification) and specificity (here measured by the difference between the sector structure of the zone and the 
structure of other zones in the country) have a strong positive effect on labour productivity, the effect of 
concentration is not so obvious. As economies that exhibit related diversification are also those showing 
sustainable growth and full employment, relatedness in the previous sense appears as the means for avoiding 
relocation that would result from direct production costs differentials.  
However, what matters is not really the existing variety of goods (and services), or the nature of clustering, but 
how it comes to the fore and evolves. When considering innovation as a process of creative destruction, the 
geographical dimension of this process and the sector composition of local areas depend less on fundamentals 
than on the conditions that make viable the process of change. Indeed, such a process inevitably generates 
distortions in the structure of productive capacity that require adjustments to be carried out in time. In this 
perspective, competition is not only aimed at equalising supply and demand in a given market and technological 
environment, but has also to adapt both structure and technology to opportunities created by expanding markets. 
It should be viewed, not as a state (perfect competition), but as a process, which implies that market connexions 
(or imperfections) are essential means that make it possible to co-ordinate both competitive and complementary 
investments. In the latter perspective, public intervention cannot be reduced to create the conditions of 
enforcement of perfect competition rules (see Richardson 1960). 
As a matter of fact, technological development, which is effectively the way for advanced countries to take 
advantage of the new division of labour by creating new varieties of goods, is not only driven by incentives such 
as determined by given rules or institutions, but is based upon on the ability of changing both local and global 
relations without creating too much perturbations. While new organisational structures for innovation result in 
part from strengthening linkages within territorial production complexes, innovation increasingly rests upon the 
primacy of extra-regional relationships. “Globalisation, in other words, presupposes a reconstruction of the 
spatial division of labour creating new forms of articulations between global and regional levels that move well 
beyond one-dimensional portraits of global ‘footlooseness’ (in which the region is subsumed within a corporate 
division of labour, something which is still characteristic of transnational strategies) or putatively autonomous 
industrial districts (in which the global dimension is derived as a market-outcome of inter-regional trade)” 
(Gordon 1994 p. 38). This definition of globalisation is essential in the perspective of understanding the 
difference between a pure competition strategy, of which we have mentioned the weaknesses, and a co-
ordination strategy, the necessity of which derives from the existence of distortions that cannot be removed only 
by using the price mechanism. 
Co-ordination has multiple facets. Changes in the way in which innovation is achieved demands changes in the 
way local and external linkages are organised. Relocation of economic activities is an unavoidable effect of such 
an evolutionary process. In the first stage of the innovation process it may be decisive to combine innovative 
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capabilities of a small number of existing firms with the driving force of a State (public) demand. New industry 
emerges not from localised entrepreneurial initiative (or pre-existing location factors), but from a conjunction of 
innovation in established firms and extensive public intervention through specific programmes, specific physical 
infrastructures and dedicated subsidies. This conjunction results in new growth poles1. In the second stage, the 
market dominates growth of innovative activities, both because sunk costs have been covered and because 
horizontal and vertical diversifications enlarge the size of the market. This shift in the economic (and 
technological) trajectory consolidates the initial location. This does not mean that public intervention becomes 
useless. Successful globalisation processes, which imply the interconnection of diverse and multiple capabilities, 
as well as the interconnection of different markets, require public intervention. But this intervention should be 
able to chart a new course, between a sterile competitive struggle and a form of co-ordination – protectionism - 
that would end in a regional isolation. In the third stage, innovation is willing to be common in its economic 
incidences. Innovations diffuse widely, and the originating local environment faces higher competitive pressure 
from other environments that succeeded in reaching similar capabilities and related economic performance. In 
that third stage, a reshuffling of policy-making is often needed to delineate and support new entrepreneurial 
initiatives, and impeding harmful consequences of changes in the location of some industrial segments.   
In this perspective, what is at stake is not deindustrialisation and relocation per se, but the creative destruction 
process, which is behind the scene, and how to deal with. Innovation or any change that implies a breaking down 
in industrial and market structures and the appearance of sunk costs has implications on the spatial distribution of 
economic activities. Thus, spatial as well as industrial issues are mainly co-ordination (largely domestic) issues 
related to the distortions in the structure of productive capacity and the sunk costs associated with it. Openness 
and the emergence of new countries in the international trade do not create difficulties per se. They create 
difficulties insofar as local disequilibria, which result from changes in the international environment, are not 
correctly dealt with. They may even be a means for ensuring a better co-ordination because the enlargement of 
market.  
Briefly, market disequilibria and distortions in the productive capacity that necessarily emerge call for local co-
ordination of economic activities, which cannot amount to simply re-establishing competitiveness by reducing 
production costs or creating niches for new products. Co-ordination should consist in creating the conditions for 
firms to deal with sunk costs, which are the unavoidable consequence of structural change. Helping the 
constitution of networks, supporting co-operation agreements, facilitating access to financial and human 
resources are elements of the required policy mix that include competition, regulation, or banking policies.  
Thus there is no fatality of a core – periphery pattern. Indeed, increasing returns and product differentiation make 
it possible to have a huge increase in intra-industry international trade. Thus, the extension of trade may take 
place without a sizeable reallocation of resources (and relocation) or income distribution effects. All depends on 
the way co-ordination issues are dealt with, within economies and between economies. The basic idea is that 
growth and the realization of increasing returns can take place in different countries preserving their 
                                                 
1 Contrary to what is universally considered, Silicon Valley is exemplary of this kind of initial impulse. “The state was 
involved in every aspect of the microelectronics industry’s emergence and early development. Advanced military and 
aerospace demand provided the principal market for microelectronics, established research priorities in product and process 
innovation, stabilized high profits for successful companies and underwrote the risks of new product developments. The vast 
majority of scientists, engineers and technicians in the microelectronics industry acquired state-of-the-art and practical 
knowledge in government-financed university or corporate research and development programs” (Gordon, 1994 p. 39) 
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heterogeneity, but without creating more inequality among them. Provided, though, that we look at trade 
liberalization, growth and innovation in the light of the interpretation of evolution process that focuses on co-
ordination conditions.  
4. Relocation and the evolution process: the role of trade 
Any breaking-up in a pre-existing industrial and spatial structure results in disequilibria between supply and 
demand of final product at each moment of time and over time. Such discrepancies are not policy (or institution) 
dependent, but are in the nature of any structural change. They have both an internal and an external dimension 
that must be dealt with. In this perspective international trade as well as foreign direct investments matter, but 
not only with respect to initial endowments or existing externalities. One can imagine that firms do not need to 
be located near the market for their products. But a market must exist. And its existence depends on what 
happens on the supply side within the different geographical areas. Firms may decide to delocalise their 
production in the South in order to reduce their production costs. But such a decision will be justified only if the 
market in the North does not disappear, or if the market in the South is a substitute for it. In the latter case, the 
core – periphery pattern would be really reversed and relocation would go really hand-to-hand with 
deindustrialisation and structural increase in unemployment in the North. In the former case, production and 
employment must be sustained in the North by means of appropriate public intervention. 
In fact, for an open economy, balanced growth results from the harmonization of external and internal demand 
with the productive capacity. Trade and openness may be very important factors both in increasing the long run 
growth potential, and in smoothing fluctuations due to country specific shocks; but this positive role is fulfilled 
only if the economy has internal resources – the reference is mainly to productive capacity, but also to a 
sufficient level of revenues - to match the increase in demand and to keep the balance that is necessary to 
successfully complete a transition process. 
Consider the case of two regions (countries), which exhibit a complementarity of final demand, and take for 
example the case of a shift of preferences from goods produced in a country (call it country 1) to those produced 
in its trading partner (country 2) (Saraceno 2001). This kind of change can be regarded as a change in transport 
costs that allows the firms in one country to be more competitive than firms of the other one, given a huge wage 
differential. Standard economic analysis, in which co-ordination happens ‘by assumption’, tells us that a relative 
price change (either via prices or via the nominal exchange rate) will accommodate the new and different 
preferences. Thus, production and unemployment will remain unaffected, as the burden of adjustment 
exclusively falls on prices. In a sequential out-of-equilibrium process, instead, price variability is not likely to be 
enough. The expected increase in the income of country 2 should generate an increase of imports and hence in 
the demand for the goods of country 1 (partially compensating the preference shift) and hence, as a side effect, 
an increase in the income of the latter. Symmetrically, the initial drop in the demand for the goods of country 1 
should involve a decrease of its income and imports, and hence a decrease of the demand for goods of country 2 
generating an excess capacity in this country. The final result depends on the way necessary adjustments to re-
establish complementarity take place. 
Investment must be carried out in region 2 that takes time. It implies that revenues will be distributed while the 
goods in which they will be spent cannot be provided out of the current local output. Inflationary pressures 
and/or trade deficit will follow. Then the standard prescription consisting in fighting inflation and keeping prices 
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flexible could result in cutting investment spending, and aggravating distortions in the two regions (ibid.) A 
policy aimed at sustaining investment only in region 2 would favour this region and likely generate an uneven 
development and a dualistic structure. However, if in the country 1 the increase in demand due to the trading 
effect more than compensates the initial decrease due to the preference shock, a policy mix may prove necessary 
in this country as well, in order to allow investment in new capacity. Therefore, sustaining investment in both 
countries would help absorbing the shock and prevent a too large gap between the growth rates of the two 
regions.  
In other words, complementarity of external demands (i.e. international trade) should stimulate faster growth in 
the exchanging countries. However, trade advantages can be captured only if appropriate interventions for 
sustaining investment in new production processes are realized in a context where demand complementarity adds 
to the complexity of adjustments. Production, as often stressed (Amendola, Gaffard 1998), takes time, which 
implies distortions in productive capacity resulting in current market disequilibria in exchanging countries that 
try to adjust through investment. The restructuring of productive capacity in the two countries has to be 
accommodated by transfers (or by an easing of financing conditions) that allow the re-absorption of the shock. 
For these interventions not to bring about unbearable distortions in the structure of productive capacity, the 
balance between investment and consumption must be maintained, so as to allow each economy to reach a 
threshold beyond which complementarity of demand between countries becomes effective, smoothing 
fluctuations and thus resulting a growth factor. Then, relocation will only permit a better allocation of resources, 
without adding to pre-existing distortions. 
While new economic geography modelling tells us that change in fundamentals does not induce a change in the 
size of markets, sequential analysis reveals the existence of domestic distortions that affect reciprocal demands 
and generate perturbations in the growth process. These perturbations, which cannot be removed by just allowing 
price and wage flexibility, require investment spending aimed at enhancing structural changes . 
5. Policy implications 
The obsession with competitiveness is certainly based on a wrong appreciation of the possible impact of 
international trade (Krugman 1994). Nevertheless it seems to be justified in established (old) industrial districts 
or in small countries insofar as their performances mainly depend on external demand, which is a parameter for 
these economies. Competitiveness strategy, which consists in capturing this external demand by decreasing 
production costs, can even be successful in these cases. At the opposite, the same obsession is dangerous in the 
case of innovative districts or larger countries, when final demand is not independent of what happens inside the 
territory and hence cannot be considered as given. In the latter case, it is essential to consider the nature of both 
internal and external driving forces of final demand.  
In the case of large European countries, the real issue lies in the complex array of factors that determine labour 
productivity rather than in failures in their capacity to deal with international or interregional competition. As a 
consequence, there is no solution that would consist in things as simple as subsidising high technology, reducing 
fiscal pressure, in fact in conducing implicit or explicit industrial policies only based on corporate strategy 
concepts such as competitiveness. Enhancing productivity growth does not imply simply supporting research 
that can improve capabilities of firms engaged in international trade, but also and mainly requires different forms 
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of co-ordination that support a regular growth process despite huge structural changes (and, in fact, efficiently 
deal with them).  
As already mentioned, the main dimension of these forms of co-ordination is to be concerned with the nature of 
innovation as a distributed phenomenon, that is, with a phenomenon that involves many actors both at the micro 
and at the macro level. In this perspective, innovation policy cannot be reduced to changing rules and institutions 
and hence enhancing R&D spending. It is a policy aimed at monitoring the process of change. Two central 
implications have to be emphasised. The one is its discretionary dimension and its underlying experimental 
character; the other is its inherent combinatory character. Innovation (or growth) policy is actually a complex 
mix between supply and demand policies, between structural and macroeconomic policies (see Rodrik 2003 for a 
historical appreciation). This is particularly true in such complicated matters as firms’ location and geographical 
distribution of productive activities. To ensure the stability in firms’ location, policy-makers have to rely on a 
combination of structural policies and policies aimed at smoothing fluctuations and avoiding destructive 
cumulative processes. It is the complexity of mutual interaction between the two components that create the 
difficulty and the governance issue of innovation policy. 
In particular, eligible local policies depend on the global one. If the latter is responsible for a low growth rate 
(and a high unemployment rate), then the former cannot be but competitiveness policies as previously defined, 
or, according to another social view, policies only dedicated at compensating social damages. None of these 
policies can be efficient with regards to the nature of employment (and productivity) issues, and allow 
international trade being a positive sum game. Thus relocation tendencies require a combination between 
macroeconomic policies that favour the accumulation of capital, and structural policies that directly target the 
organisation of industry, stimulating innovation process at the firm or industry level. As previously mentioned, 
avoiding harmful consequences of changes in location implies sustaining local demand for final products. 
However the latter requires not only increasing local incomes, but, also, creating local conditions for the rise in 
the production volume, and hence in the wage bill. Management of demand is never independent from the 
stimulation of supply. There is a dilemma due to the fact that wages are both an essential part of production costs 
and the main component of final demand, which is at the heart of the articulation between local and global 
policies, between structural and macroeconomic policies. Two drawbacks should be avoided: on the one hand, 
increasing demand without increasing supply, which would be the case when public interventions only consists 
in augmenting the take-out on productive resources and redistributing the total income; on the other hand, 
increasing supply without increasing demand, which would be the case when public interventions are reduced to 
a fiscal and a social dumping. 
Thus, one of the main challenges is to identify both objectives and instruments of structural policies that make it 
possible that changes in location not result in higher unemployment rate in some countries. These policies should 
be mainly oriented to promote local specific resources. Instead of systematically diminishing the sunk costs to be 
borne by firms, they should be dedicated at raising strong barriers to exit (relocation), which take the form of 
local linkages that help the creation of technology. Different modes of intervention must be assessed with respect 
to this objective. Thus local policies must stimulate R&D and education, but they make sense because, far from 
being a part of a policy exclusively oriented to support the competitiveness of the country, they are carried out 
together with other public policies all of them being growth oriented.  Concerning education and research, it is 
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certainly important to promote an institutional architecture that creates good incentives, but this architecture 
must also favour the accumulation of adapted human resources in order to prevent any distortion on the labour 
market2.  As for scientific  - long-term – investments, the benefits to be expected from any project for the local 
area in which it is settled (such as e.g. the ITER project) mainly depend on the ability of creating local linkages 
that allows designing and producing new products and services. This ability is associated with rules and 
governance mechanisms that favour a better co-ordination between competitive and complementary investments. 
These rules and mechanisms are not the same that those generally considered as emblematic of policies that 
focus on competitiveness of territories: they imply partnership and cooperation agreements that must be 
promoted rather than condemned. As for new sectors, such as biotechnology or life science industry, policies 
should be aimed at securing innovation and growth. E.g. in the case of German biotechnology industry, while 
most of the companies de-located R&D facilities, a series of public interventions helped reverse the movement. 
These policies provided direct subsidies to projects’ coaching and monitoring, stimulated supply of ‘high level – 
low price’, thus favouring an impressive boom of small biotech firms.  
While the current consensus tends to promote deregulation of product, capital and labour markets, and privileges 
a very specific competition policy, managing the innovation process and avoiding distortions that would result in 
delocalisation and unemployment require articulated discretionary interventions, mainly aimed at remove 
barriers to growth. These interventions, instead of mimic or simply reinforce corporate strategies, have to create 
conditions that allow re-orientating these strategies. In this perspective, changes in government spending, which 
would favour product differentiation and hence allow an endogenous increase in total factor productivity, may 
result in simultaneous increases in output, employment, wages, and consumption (Devereux et alii 1996).  Thus, 
due to a huge wage differential between the North and the South, unskilled jobs will disappear in the North, but 
the gains from exchange will be really captured thanks to appropriate investment. They will allow economy in 
the North to reabsorb (frictional) unemployment without bearing a reduction in the wage rate. Relocation of 
economic activities will be only an aspect of a fruitful restructuring of productive capacity. 
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